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Abstract
This article investigates the stability of farmers’ risk attitude over time. To this end,
we estimate responses to changes in agricultural policies and production shocks. We
use a unique panel data of over 36,000 Italian farms specialised in cereals, during the
period 1989–2009. We find evidence of risk preference changes over time in response
to changes in the European Union Common Agricultural Policy and possibly after a
drought-induced production shock.
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1. Introduction
Temporal stability of risk preferences can mean that subjects exhibit the same
risk attitudes over time or that their risk attitudes are a stable function of states
of nature that change over time (Andersen et al., 2008). Risk preferences, in
turn, should be disentangled into risk attitudes and risk perception (Pennings
and Garcia, 2001; Pennings and Wansink, 2004; Just, 2008).1 Risk attitude,
*Corresponding author: E-mail: m.bozzola@qub.ac.uk
1 Debates surrounding the nature of risk preference and its measurement have a long history in
economics and psychology, and alternative definitions of risk preferences are suggested in the
literature (Mata et al., 2018).
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risk perception and their interaction are important determinants of the adoption
and use of specific risk management tools and practices (Pennings, Wansink
and Meulenberg, 2002; Pennings and Garcia, 2004; Pennings and Wansink,
2004; Just and Just, 2016). However, measuring these concepts in separation
in non-experimental settings is very difficult (Iyer et al., 2020).
In this article, we attempt to capture risk attitude recovering Arrow–Pratt
(AP) and downside (DS) risk coefficients from secondary data of farmers’
observed behaviours. We focus on risk attitude that reflects an agent’s general
predisposition to risk in a consistent way, whereas risk perceptions may be
defined as her assessment of the uncertainty of the risk content inherent in a
particular situation (Pennings, Wansink and Meulenberg, 2002). Using panel
data of over 36,000 Italian farms during the period 1989–2009, we test whether
the assumption of risk attitude stability over time holds in the context of
major changes in the environment in which farmers operate. In particular, we
investigate changes in farmers’ risk attitude in response to multiple shocks
coming from policy reforms over a long period of time and production shocks
triggered by droughts, a type of extreme climate event.
Several studies in the general economic literature have shown that experienc-
ing extreme events such as droughts, floods and earthquakes (Eckel, El-Gamal
and Wilson, 2009; Page, Savage and Torgler, 2014; Hanaoka, Shigeoka and
Watanabe, 2018) or a major traumatic experience such as a civil war (Kim
and Lee, 2014) can affect risk attitude over time. Studies conducted after the
onset of the financial crisis that started in 2008 address the possibility that
a (negative) shock can trigger large increases in agents’ risk aversion over a
relatively short period of time (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2018). Previous literature has investigated these effects based
on controlled experimental research (Cohn et al., 2015) or exploited specific
potentially exogenous shocks (Kahsay and Osberghaus, 2018; Hanaoka, Shi-
geoka andWatanabe, 2018). The general idea is to investigate decision makers’
risk-taking behaviour in a field setting. Kahsay and Osberghaus (2018) use
two rounds of survey data of German households and find evidence of an
increase in risk-seeking behaviours after people experience storm damage. The
authors highlight the fact that there is scarcity of research looking at the effects
of natural hazards on risk preferences in the European context, unlike other
developed regions of the words such as the USA (Eckel, El-Gamal andWilson,
2009), Australia (Page, Savage and Torgler, 2014) and East Asia (Hanaoka,
Shigeoka andWatanabe, 2018). Furthermore, only few applications investigate
the temporal stability of risk attitude with focus on the agricultural sector (Love
and Robison, 1984 and Koundouri, Laukkanen and Myyra, 2009).2 The focus
on agricultural applications is highly promising because farmers face a high-
risk exposure and extreme events from different risk sources (Moscardi and de
2 The article by Love and Robison (1984) is one of the early contributions to this field. The authors
examined the intertemporal stability of risk preferences eliciting them from a small sample of 23
American farmers in 1979 and then again in 1981 and concluded that risk preferences were not
stable over time.
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Janvry, 1977; Leathers and Quiggin, 1991; Chavas and Holt, 1996; Hennessy,
1998; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001; Roe 2015; Trujillo-Barrera, Pennings
and Hofenk, 2016). Yet, the role of different sources of shocks on farmer risk
attitudes remained unexplored so far. More specifically, public policies have
been shown to affect risk attitude but this side effect of public policies has
been mostly neglected in the academic and policy debate (Aragón, Molina and
Outes-Leon, 2017).
We aim to contribute filling these gaps by investigating the (in)stability of
farmer risk attitude over time looking at the effect of both policy changes
and production shocks driven by weather. To this end, we recover farmer risk
attitude from a large and temporally long panel data set that includes farm-
level information on input expenditures and output realisation and test for
changes in risk attitude after facing major policy and climate shocks. More
specifically, we use a unique data set for Italian cereal farmers covering a
period of 21 years from 1989 to 2009 and containing more than 36,000 farm
observations. Data are unbalanced. The total number of farm-year observations
is about 116,700. We investigate farmers’ adjustments in input choices based
on the method of moments approach first proposed by Antle (1983, 1987). The
use of panel data techniques allows to control to a certain extent for unobserved
heterogeneity or path dependency. However, the use of secondary data does not
allow us to control for all unobserved variation in the environments in which
farmers operate, or due to environmental (Saastamoine, 2015) or individual
characteristics not recorded in our data set such as age, gender and parental
background (Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2011; Kim and Lee,
2014). As thoroughly discussed in a recent review by Iyer et al., (2020), the
here chosen approach does not allow to observe the range of attributes that we
would observe in experimental data. This shortcoming substantially increases
the chance that the estimated risk aversion coefficients will be biased. Lence
(2009) warns that typical production data rarely contain enough information
to allow identification of the structure of risk aversion, but seems to accept
estimations of risk coefficients in large samples (Lence, 2009; Foudi and
Erdlenbruch, 2012). Just and Just (2011) criticise more harshly the method
arguing that separate identification of (production) risk and risk preferences
from behavioural equations estimated on observed data is impossible, hence
restrictions have to be imposed either on the technology or on the form of the
utility function for parameters to be identified, which in turn undermines the
possibility of global identification of risk preferences.
The use of methods based on multi-item scales and methods based on
lottery-choice tasks, which become more frequent in the last decade (Iyer
et al., 2020), partly overcomes the limitations faced by empirical studies from
observed behavioural secondary data, like the analysis suggested in this article.
However, these methods elicit preferences from primary data, and although
we recommend them for future studies, they would not allow us to recover
risk attitude and changes related to major events that happened in the past.
Furthermore, none of the previous studies using econometric estimations based
on secondary farm-level data to attempt recovering risk attitude parameters
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relies on a large countrywide panel data set, covering such a long period of time
as the one used in this article. Italy is also an excellent case study to investigate
the impact of changing policy and climate shocks on European farms, due
to the highly heterogeneous climatic, soil, socio-economic and topographical
features of the Italian peninsula (Bozzola et al., 2018). In the 20 years covered
by our data, the Italian farming sector experienced various shocks. This allows
us to investigate changes in farmers’ risk attitude in response tomultiple shocks
coming from policy reforms over a long period of time and extreme climate
events. First, we look at shocks related to major changes in the European Union
(EU) CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP), i.e. the agricultural policy of the EU.
These reforms started in 1992 and introduced main policy changes in European
agriculture. Second, we look at climate shocks, focusing on the effects of two
large-scale drought events in 2003 and 2007.
We find evidence of risk preference changes over time in response to major
changes in the agricultural policy and to the droughts. Thus, we provide new
evidence that the CAP and changes therein as well as exposure to climate
shocks influence risk attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section,
we provide a policy and historical background of the main events in the
Italian agriculture covered in this article and we formulate some hypothesis on
farmers’ risk attitude based on the existing literature. In Section 3 we describe
the data set. In Section 4, we outline the conceptual and empirical model.
Section 5 presents the main results. In Section 6, we draw some conclusions
and outline new research avenues.
2. Policy and historical background
In this section, we provide background information about the events that could
have led to temporal instability of Italian farmers’ risk attitude during the 20-
year period covered by our data. We offer an overview in Table 5, with a focus
on the influence of these events on the Italian farming sector. We refer to the
relevant literature to formulate hypothesis on farmers’ risk attitude.
2.1. The reforms of the EU CAP
Farms specialised in cereals are of outmost importance for Italian agriculture
and were particularly affected by the CAP reforms of the 1990s (Sckokai and
Moro, 2006; Platoni, Sckokai and Moro, 2012) and by the Fishler reform
(Swinnen, 2008; Moro and Sckokai, 2013). The process towards a (partially)
decoupled support to farmers started in 1992 with the Mac Sharry reform. The
1992 reform constituted a major shift from product support (through prices)
to producer support (through income support) and marked the beginning of a
series of CAP reforms. The Mac Sharry reform transitional period ended in
July 1995 and the main implementation phase lasted until 1998.3 In 1999 the
3 In November 1993, the European Commission (EC) presented an Agricultural Strategy Paper
in which it examined three different options for reforming further the CAP. These ranged from
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Table 1. Selection of sub-periods for the empirical analysis
Relevant events and time
period
Background information and hypothesis
regarding risk attitude
[1] 1989–1991
Pre-CAP reform period
Farmers are expected to be risk averse or
risk neutral (Roche and McQuinn, 2004;
Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas,
2006; Groom et al., 2008; Koundouri,
Laukkanen and Myyra, 2009).
[2] 1992–1999
Mac Sharry reform
The process towards a (partially)
decoupled support to farmers started in
1992 with the Mac Sharry reform. The
CAP shifts from market support to
producer support. This 7-year reform
period can be broadly divided into two
phases: a transition phase (1993–1995)
and the implementation phase
(1996–1999).
[2a] 1993–1995
Mac Sharry—transition
phase The Uruguay Round
Agreement in Agriculture
entered into force In 1993
negotiations for accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden
to the EU began. These
countries entered the EU in
1995
Ambiguous impact on cereal farmers’ risk
attitudes:
Risk aversion may decrease because of
the reduction in the random component of
farmers’ income and the effect of direct
payments on wealth effect (Koundouri,
Laukkanen and Myyra, 2009; Femenia,
Gohin and Carpentier, 2010). Farmers’
risk aversion may increase due to policy
uncertainties (Moschini and Hennessy,
2001; REAS, 2010).
[2b] 1996–1999
Mac
Sharry—implementation
phase
The uncertainty stemming from the new
CAP reform and the other policy changes
that happened at the beginning of the 90s
decreased.
[3] 2000–2002
Agenda 2000 CAP reform,
up to the 2003 climate shock
This CAP reform did not change the basic
structure of the new regime, but further
reduced the intervention prices and
increased the cereal area payments
(Platoni, Sckokai and Moro, 2012).
Hence, the two effects described in row
2a may still apply, but we expect the
drivers of increasing risk attitude to be
less severe.
Continued
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Table 1. Continued
Relevant events and time
period
Background information and hypothesis regarding
risk attitude
[4] 2003–2004
The Midterm Review of
Agenda 2000
(a.k.a. the ‘June 2003
Fischler reform’), and the
2003 climate shock
The June 2003 Fischler reform introduced the
single farm payment decoupling, a large share of
CAP support from production from 2005
onwards. The switch to decoupling was a major
structural change in farmers’ income support.
In 2003 the whole Italian peninsula was hit by a
major drought. After individuals experience, a
main shock risk attitude may change but the sign
of the change is ambiguous a priori. (Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2018) conclude that a
(negative) shock can trigger large increases in
agents’ risk aversion over a relatively short
period of time. Kahsay and Osberghaus (2018),
however, find evidence of an increase in
risk-seeking behaviours after people experience
storm damage. None of these studies focuses on
the agricultural sector. In agriculture,
experiencing extreme events may lead to sudden
changes in farmers’ behaviour, investment and
productive decision therein (Carey and
Zilberman, 2002; Ding, Schoengold and Tadesse,
2009; Nauges, Wheeler and Zuo, 2016).
[5a] 2005–2007
Fischler
reform—implementation
phase
From 2005 to 2009 the CAP went through the
implementation phase of the Fischler reform. If
farmers’ risk preferences are consistent with
DARA, direct payments should reduce their risk
aversion (Saha, Love and Schwart 1994; Chavas
and Holt, 1996; Koundouri et al., 2009). The new
policy may have induced those farmers who
choose to produce to allocate more land to riskier
products than previously (Roche and McQuinn,
2004).
[5b] 2008–2009
Post-2007 climate shock
Repeated production shocks, in the article captured
by recurring droughts (i.e. a type of climate
shock), may exacerbate the effects described in
row 4.
‘Agenda 2000’ reformwas introduced. This second CAP reform did not change
the basic structure of the new regime, but further reduced the intervention
maintaining the status quo to proposing a new radical reform, drastically reducing EU prices to
world market levels and abolishing production quotas and other supply management measures
(EC, 1995).
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prices and increased the cereal area payments (Platoni, Sckokai and Moro,
2012). Following the 1992 reform, the level of support for cereal farmers
reduced by about 30 per cent, with guaranteed prices of cereals lowered by
35 per cent. However, volatility of agricultural prices in Italy remained limited
and below the European average (Visciaveo and Rosa, 2012). Italian cereal
farmers anticipated the fall in prices. Koundouri, Laukkanen andMyyra (2009)
argue a similar case about Finnish cereal producers: although output prices
decreased significantly at the time Finland entered the EU, the fall in prices was
completely anticipated by producers at the time cereal production decisions
for 1995 were made. Furthermore, the authors argue that in the period 1995–
2003 yield variability was the dominant determinant of variability in wheat
and barley revenues, whereas the variability of prices and acreage was less
relevant.
Compulsory set-aside measure and other accompanying measures were also
introduced, together with two components to farm income: an area payment
component and a market component. The first depends on the land allocation
decision, whereas the second is the one that might generate more uncertainty,
which can come from both market prices and yields. Some authors argue that
the increase in the cereal area payment substantially increased the share of non-
random income, which in turn led to riskier behaviour (Koundouri, Laukkanen
and Myyra, 2009). Direct payments can affect the incentives to produce
for risk-averse farmers through their impact on farmers’ wealth (Hennessy,
1998; Femenia, Gohin and Carpentier, 2010). Other authors, on the contrary,
stress that the reform increased uncertainty in the sector because farmers felt
uncertainty about the stability of political support for direct payments, which
was amajor cause of farmers’ resistance to lower prices (Bernstein et al., 1999).
Moreover, the Single Payment Scheme providing farmers with a fixed amount
was introduced only after 2003.
During the implementation period of the Mac Sharry reform, the European
agricultural sector went through other major policy changes: the Uruguay
Round Agreement in Agriculture (The [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)] entered into force and the EU enlarged with three new mem-
bers: Austria, Finland and Sweden). Subsequently, the EC started examining
different options for the future development of the CAP. The Mac Sharry
reform and the Agenda 2000 are discussed and implemented before the 2003
climate shock, whereas the Fischler reform started in June 2003 with the so
called ‘The Mid-term Review of the Agenda 2000’. The Fischler reform, with
the switch to decoupling, has been another major structural change in farmers’
income support. The main element of the June 2003 Fischler reform was the
introduction of the single farm payment, decoupling a large share of CAP
support from production. While this reform was announced and implemented
two major droughts hit the Italian peninsula, causing severe damages to the
agricultural sector (production shocks).
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2.2. The 2003 and 2007 droughts
In the summer of 2003, the whole Italian peninsula and many other areas of
Europe faced the most severe drought event and heat wave in decades and
the hottest summer in Europe since the 16th century (World Meteorological
Organization, 2003). These severe climate conditions began in Europe in June
2003 and continued until mid-August, with summer temperatures 20–30 per
cent higher than the seasonal average. The agricultural sector was amongst the
most severely hit by the persistent droughts (Fink et al., 2004; Ciais et al., 2005;
García-Herrera et al., 2010).
A second severe drought hit the Italian agricultural sector in 2007. This
second drought was particularly severe in the north of the Italian peninsula:
it started by the end of 2006 and the poor weather conditions extended through
2007, with a spring and summer drier and hotter than seasonal long-term
averages in many parts of Italy (Italian National Institute for Environmental
Protection and Research (ISPRA), 2008).
3. Data
Our data set comprises farm-level data from the Italian FarmAccountancyData
Network (FADN) and includes more than 36,600 farms specialised in cereals
and various field crops covering the 21-year period, from 1989 to 2009. Farms
are located across the Italian territory. Data are unbalanced and on average
each farm is included in the data set for 3.2 years, and the total number of
farm-year observations is about 116,700. The Italian authorities in charge of
data collection had improved the sampling methodology through the years,
but the Italian cereal farmers included in the analysis can be considered a
representative sample through time. For this reason, we perform the analysis
using the entire available data set instead of relying on a much smaller data set
weakly unbalanced, for which selection biases would be expected.4
The data set provides detailed information about the main production
orientation, the value of the fixed assets, variable input expenditure by crop for
key inputs such as fertilisers, labour, seeds and crop protection products, some
other input information (such as average work units), income and structural
characteristics of the farms. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and short
definitions for each variable used in this study.
4. Conceptual and empirical model
We use a flexible estimation approach where we consider uncertainty by using
moments of the profit distribution as determining farmers’ decisions regarding
the input mix. This flexible approach has been developed by Antle (1983,
4 For robustness analysis, we also obtained the AP and DS risk aversion parameters for the entire
period from a smaller sample of 1,779 cereal farms, including in the estimations only those farms
appearing in the data set for at least 10 years. The estimated AP and DS risk aversion parameters
are 0.6193 and 0.0088, respectively, andwe strongly reject the null hypothesis of these coefficient
being zero, coherently with the results presented in Table 3.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and variables definitions
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Net profit/loss 22.5 78.8 −3207 5965
Farm net income (‘000e)
Fertilisers 3,300 9,335 0 1,172,010
Total fertiliser and soil improvers expenditure (e). It includes purchased lime, compost,
peat, manure
Labour 1.61 1.91 0.02 140.16
Total labour input expressed in annual work units (AWU) = full-time person equivalents
Seeds/seedlings purchased 3,443 18,202 0 2,597,102
Total seeds/seedlings purchased (e)
Crop protection 2,507 10,842 0 1,098,953
Total crop protection products expenditure (e)
Total assets (‘000e) 446.5 1,547 0 90,600
Value of fixed assets (e).
Land 28.6 64.5 0.1 4290
Total UAA
Share of irrigated land 0.11 0.27 0 1
Total UAA under irrigation/total UAA (hectares/hectares)
Share of rented land 0.31 0.39 0 1
Total UAA rented/total UAA (hectares/hectares)
Share fallow land 0.02 0.07 0 0.96
Agricultural land not cultivated for agricultural reasons/total UAA (hectares/hectares)
Dummy LFA 0.42 0.49 0 1
Dummy variable, 1 if the majority of the UAA is in a mountain or non-mountain LFA
Family 0.26 0.44 0 1
Dummy variable, 1 if
organisational form is registered
as an individual (family) farm
Total farms: 36,691, including: specialist cereals, general field cropping and mixed cropping. More details on the data
used in this study are provided in the Table A1. SD= standard deviation; Min. =minimum; Max. =maximum.
1987); Antle and Goodger (1984) and Kumbhakar (2002) and has been used
to estimate risk attitude (Groom et al., 2008; Koundouri, Laukkanen and
Myyra, 2009). Thismodel is ideally suited to analyse responses to interventions
in uncertain environments (Groom et al., 2008 pp. 316) and is particularly
appropriate to be applied when agents are exposed to various type of risks,
such as production, market and policy risks (Gardebroek, 2006).
We assume that farmer’s behaviour is consistent with expected utility
theory.5 Hence, cereal farmers maximise expected utility, which is depicted as
a function of moments of the profit distribution by estimating the distribution
5 Just and Peterson (2010) argue that the Expected Utility Theory is not applicable to every
situation and suggest a calibration procedure to compute the degree of minimum concavity
that rationalises observed choice behaviour, which is directly comparable with the estimates of
risk-aversion coefficients based on the same (Just and Peterson, 2010).
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of the error term. Those moments have the same vector X as an argument, so
that the farmer’s program becomes:
max
X
E [U (π)] = F [μ1(X),μ2(X), . . . ,μm(X)] (1)
where U is the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function representing the
farmer’s risk preferences and π is the farmer’s profit. μj =E [−E ()]j i.e.
μj=E [− μ1]j and j= 2, . . . ,m is the centralmth moment of profit.6 These are
obtained following the sequential procedure described below, which follows
Kim and Chavas (2003).
First, we estimate the conditional expectation of profit (mean effect regres-
sion):
πit = f
(
xit, qit, zt;β
) + αi + γit where αi + uit = γit (2)
We use a large data set of Italian agriculture that comprises farm-level
data for more than 36,600 farms specialised in cereals and other open field
crops production, referring to the period 1989–2009. We regress total observed
profit from production (π it) on all levels, squares and interaction of variable
input expenditure/annual units, captured by the vector xit (fertilisers, seeds,
crop protection products and labor).7 We use a quadratic functional form
following earlier studies (Kumbhakar and Tveteras, 2003; Koundouri, Nauges
and Tzouvelekas, 2006; Groom et al., 2008; Zuo, Nauges and Wheeler, 2015).
We also include a vector qit of other important covariates, such as the area
of the utilised agricultural area (UAA), the share of land rented and under
irrigation, the value of fixed assets and a dummy variable indicating if the farm
is registered as a family farm. The subscripts i=1, . . . ,N and t=1, . . . , T denote,
respectively, individual farm units and the time periods (years).
We also include year dummies (vector z) to remove any general time trend
affecting all farmers identically. Moreover, the year dummies are important
in our setting, to mitigate the confounding effect that inflation may have on
expenditure data, since we use a very long panel data set (1989–2009).8 Other
variables such as weather conditions are not directly under the farmer’s control
and contribute to profit variability (Zuo, Nauges and Wheeler, 2015).
6 (Chavas, 2004) shows that the AP risk premium can be approximated by a linear function of the
firstmmoments of the distribution of profit.
7 All variables are scaled by their standard deviation, as in (Groom et al., 2008) and (Vollenweider,
Di Falco and O’Donoghue, 2011).
8 FADN data for input quantities are not available for the time period under study, with the excep-
tion of labour. Hence, the use expenditure data might include price developments, especially
given the long period of time under scrutiny in this paper. The here used FADN has already
applied rates to convert monetary values from the Italian lira to EUR that change over time for the
period 1989–1999 to reflect inflation. Moreover, we include year fixed effects in the estimations
and we conduct several sensitivity analyses for sub-periods. Beyond this, the empirical case for
deflating may be weak compared with the risk of introducing severe measurement errors that
could be due, amongst other, to the need of compiling longer time series from the price indices
released for specific sub-periods, and with different base years. These indices, in turn, present
variation in the type and number of items included in their underlying baskets through time.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/erae/advance-article/doi/10.1093/erae/jbaa021/5904491 by guest on 18 N
ovem
ber 2020
Stability of risk attitude, agricultural policies and production shocks 11
The panel structure of our data set allows to estimate equation (2) using
a fixed-effect estimator. This provides consistent parameters even if there is
correlation between the independent variables and time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity.9 Hence, the error term associated to equation (2) is disentan-
gled as follows: γit =αi +uit. We control for unobserved farm-specific effects
through αiwhile uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Hynes and Garvey (2009)
highlight the advantages of panel data techniques over static frameworks and
warn that where no attempt is made to control for unobserved heterogeneity
or path dependency, the effects of the farm-specific characteristics may be
overestimated (Hynes and Garvey, 2009 pp. 546). The use of fixed-effects
estimation methods, the inclusion of farm size and other relevant explanatory
variables and the fact that we focus on a group of farms relatively homogeneous
in term of technologies adopted, i.e. cereal farmers10, limit our concerns of
cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk attitude. This can be due to producer
characteristics such as education and parental background or environment
characteristics (Saastamoinen, 2015). In this setting, although cross-individual
heterogeneity cannot be fully accounted for, we attempt to obtain information
about changes in risk aversion in the farm population following aggregate
shocks, but we cannot trace this back to each individual farm.We acknowledge
the fact that even if we focus on a certain production type, heterogeneity in risk
attitude cannot be fully captured. Pennings and Garcia (2004) for example,
found that the impact of risk attitudes on behaviour may change across farmers
even for homogeneous farmers.
In the second step of our empirical procedure, the estimates of the first
moment of the profit distribution (ûit) are then raised to the power two and three
to compute conditional higher moments (variance and skewness, respectively).
We opted against consideration of additional moments as Antle (1983) and
Groom et al. (2008) found that estimation coefficients associated to the kurtosis
aversion were not significant. Along these lines, Koundouri, Nauges and
Tzouvelekas (2006) and Zuo, Nauges and Wheeler (2015) recognised that
distributions of profits in agriculture are well approximated by their first three
moments.
The predicted values raised to the power two and three are then regressed,
using the fixed-effects estimator, on the same explanatory variables included
in the estimation of the mean effect, consistently with previous empirical work
(Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas, 2006; Groom et al., 2008).
û2it = w
(
xit, qit, zt; δ
) + ˇγ it (3)
û3it = s
(
xit, qit, zt;φ
) + ∼γ it (4)
9 Besley and Case (1993); Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas (2006); Kahsay and Osberghaus
(2018) and Hanaoka, Shigeoka and Watanabe (2018) discussed limits in using simple cross-
section data.
10 Some authors stressed that conclusions on risk preference of one group of farmers (e.g. cereal
farmers) cannot be extended to other producers (e.g. vegetable farmers) (Iyer et al., 2020).
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We use the estimated coefficients from equations (2, 3, 4) (i.e. the
vectorsβ̂, δ̂, φ̂) to compute twelve analytical expression for derivatives of the
each moment with respect to each variable input (fertilisers, plant protection,
seeds and labour).
Finally, because the first-order conditions of the farmer’s program can be
approximated using a Taylor expansion in matrix form, we can estimate system
(5) of K equations (Antle 1983, 1987; Chavas, 2004). Each equation is itself
derived from the first-order condition for the kth input. Hence, system (5)
has four equations, as the number of variable inputs included as explanatory
variables, and twelve unknowns, determined by the number of variable inputs
and the number moments considered.
∂μ1 (x)
∂xk
= θ1k + θ2k ∂μ2 (x)
∂xk
+ θ3k ∂μ3 (x)
∂xk
+ uk (5)
where θ jk =−1/j!∗∂F (x) /∂μj (x) /∂F (x) /∂μ1 (x); (j= 1,2,3) and uk is the
econometric error term.
We estimate for each input k its marginal contribution to the expected profit
(given by ∂μ1 (x) /∂xk, which can be expressed as a linear combination of the
marginal contributions of each input to the variance (∂μ2 (x) /∂xk) and the
skewness (∂μ3 (x) /∂xk).
The most important feature of this model is that the estimated parameters
θ2k and θ3kare interpretable as the AP and DS risk aversion coefficients,
respectively (Antle 1987; Chavas, 2004; Groom et al., 2008).
More specifically, the AP absolute risk aversion coefficient is approximated
by:
AP = −E
(
∂2U/∂π 2
)
E (∂U/∂π)
∼= −∂F (x) /∂μ2 (x)
∂F (x) /∂μ1 (x)
= 2θ2 (6)
whereas the DS risk coefficient is approximated by:
DS = E
(
∂3U/∂π 3
)
E (∂U/∂π)
∼= ∂F (x) /∂μ3 (x)
∂F (x) /∂μ1 (x)
= −6θ3 (7)
We recover the population average AP and DS risk aversion measures
estimating system (5) through a three-stage least square (3SLS) model. We
used as instruments (i) the share of farmland not cultivated for agricultural
reasons (i.e. fallow land without subsidies) during the previous year and (ii) a
dummy variable indicating if the majority of the UAA is in an area designated
as ‘less favoured’ by the relevant regulation. Fallow land is commonly defined
as a farmland ploughed but left for a period without being sown to restore its
fertility and increase biodiversity. Less-favoured areas (LFA) are defined by
the EC as areas where agricultural production or activity are more difficult
because of natural handicaps, such as difficult climatic conditions or low soil
productivity. These exogenous variables are assumed correlated with fertilis-
ers, plant protection, seeds and labour choices in the current growing season
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but exogenous to risk attitude. After selecting the instrumental variables, we
estimated system of equation (5) exploiting interequations correlation of errors
through the 3SLS procedure, as we believe that errors across the three equations
of the system are correlated.11 We acknowledge that the use of instrumental
variables in a riskmanagement analysis is still a controversial issue in empirical
applications (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Heckman and Urzua, 2010; Larcker and
Rusticus, 2010).12 Our central research question pertains to the change in risk
attitude through time, rather than to the estimation of the magnitude of risk
attitude and their impacts on farm managerial decisions whether to adopt a
specific technology such as irrigation (Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas,
2006) or on the outcomes of specific policies on input use. Groom et al., 2008;
for example, provide an analysis of the importance to consider risk attitude, in
particular whether farmers are risk neutral or risk averse, when predicting the
impact of water quotas on production decisions. For this reason, we call for
caution in interpreting the magnitude of the estimated parameters.
We also bootstrap the standard errors, resampling them over individuals to
obtain heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
The risk aversion parameters are constrained such that θ̂2k = θ̂2 and θ̂3k = θ̂3.
Although each input can affect the moments of profit in different ways, the AP
and DS coefficients are related to the attitude over the moment of profit and
thus not assumed to be input specific.
A positive AP coefficient indicates that the decision maker is risk averse.
This implies that an agent with a positive and significant AP coefficient has
the incentive to reduce its risk exposure. Any increase in the variance of profit
would in fact increase the private cost of risk bearing.
A positive DS coefficient indicates that the decision maker is averse to DS
risk, that is, he is averse to risk distribution towards low outcomes (such as crop
failure), holding both the mean and the variance constant (Menezes, Geiss and
Tressler, 1980; Antle, 1983; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009). This implies that
an agent with a positive and significant DS coefficient is prone to implement
management strategies that affect positively the skewness of the distribution of
profits (e.g. by reducing the probability of crop failure). These considerations
are related to our understanding of farmer’s behaviour in a risky environment.
Risk-averse farmers would be more willing to adopt strategies to reduce the
variance of profit and/or exposure to DS risk.
The empirical procedure outlined in this section is implemented to estimate
system of equation (5) for pooled data of relevant sub-periods and for each
year separately as a robustness analysis. Stability of risk attitude implies that,
11 We computed the correlation matrix for the fitted residuals, and used it to perform the test
of independence of the errors in the three equations. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier
test for error independence indicates a statistically significant correlation between the errors in
the three equations. This should be expected as the marginal contribution of fertilisers, plant
protection, seeds and labour to the expected profit may have similar underlying determinants.
12 For robustness, we also obtained the risk aversion parameters using a seemingly unrelated
regression model (SUR) and they were in line with those obtained using the 3SLS estimation
procedure.
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Table 3. Estimated risk aversion: entire period 1990–2009
Years AP DS
1990–2009 0.4284∗∗∗(0.0111) 0.0095∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Notes: Estimation method: 3SLS. Bootstrapped standard errors of the underlying estimated coefficients (θ̂2 and θ̂3)in
parenthesis. Bootstrap replications: 500. Number of farms: 34,825. ∗∗∗ indicates that the null hypothesis of coefficients
of risk aversion being zero can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.We do not include 1989 in the reference period because
of the use of a lagged variable as instrument for the 3SLS estimation procedure.
in the absence of measurement error, one should obtain the same estimate of the
parameter of interest when measuring an individual’s risk attitude repeatedly
(Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018). Based on these results on farmers’ risk attitude
(i.e. AP and DS coefficients), various hypotheses are tested that concern
whether this attitude (i) remains stable over time and (ii) whether risk attitude
is influenced by major agricultural policy regime shifts and climatic extreme
events. The here considered events were presented in more detail in Section 2.
Wald test is used to test for equality of these parameters across the relevant time
periods. The null hypothesis is that attitude parameters across time periods are
stable. We also perform several sensitivity analyses (Table A1) to compare the
robustness of results when we vary marginally the length of the time under
consideration.
5. Results
The AP and DS risk aversion parameters obtained estimating the system
of equations (5) for the whole period under analysis, 1990–2009, are pos-
itive, equal to 0.4284 and 0.0095, respectively, and statistically significant
(Table 3).13,14 Our results suggest that on average Italian cereal farmers have
been averse to risk (profit variance) and to a lesser degree also to DS risk
(negative profit skewness). This suggests that farms in our sample display some
evidences of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences. Previous
literature found that DARA preferences are a common property of farmers’ risk
preferences (Chavas, 2004; Zuo, Nauges andWheeler, 2015).15 As a robustness
analysis, we also report in Table A3 the year-by-year risk aversion coefficients,
obtained estimating system (5) for each cross-section (year).
13 We provide in Table A2 the fixed-effects estimation results for the profit, variance and skewness
equations, corresponding to equations 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
14 The results are robust if we exclude from the estimation of system (5) the 2 years hit by a major
climate shock (the 2003 and 2007 droughts). In this case, the estimated AP and DS risk aversion
parameters are 0.4291 and 0.0090, respectively, and we strongly reject the null hypothesis of
these coefficients being zero.
15 A more robust conceptualisation and prediction of farmers’ reactions would require to be able
to assess both risk attitude and risk perception (Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg, 2002). This
is not possible with our data. Risk perceptions reflect the farmers’ assessment of the uncertainty
of the risk content inherent in a particular situation, and this might also change after exposure
to a climate shock or a significant policy change.
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We further look at the results obtained estimating system (5) for the relevant
sub-periods outlined in Table 5. These reveal that the parameters capturing risk
attitude might have been unstable through time. The results presented in this
section provide an indication of the general tendency in producers’ risk attitude
changes through time, in responses to major policy changes and exogenous
climate shocks, but we caution the reader to keep in mind that real world
changes in inputs will be the result of all the relevant market adjustments, as
well as some technological constraints, which cannot be fully accounted for in
our simple empirical set-up (Moro and Sckokai, 1999).
5.1. Policy-driven changes in risk attitude
We report in Table 4 the AP and DS risk aversion parameters for sub-
periods associated to relevant policies changes. The AP coefficients change in
magnitude but remain positive and statistically significant over all sub-periods
analysed. This suggests risk-averse behaviour, characterised by a concave
utility function. The DS coefficient for the different sub-periods are either
positive and statistically significant or not statistically different than zero,
indicating, on average, risk aversion or risk neutrality over DS risk. We now
analyse in more detail if and how the parameters of risk aversion have changed
through time, particularly in conjunction with major policy changes and major
climate shocks. Previous work indicated that the impact of the changes in
agricultural support on cereal farmers’ risk attitudes, brought about by the
application of the CAP, is ambiguous a priori (Koundouri, Laukkanen and
Myyra, 2009). For this reason, we complement the estimation showing the
Wald test statistic to test for the temporal stability of risk preference, using
the null hypothesis of equality between the AP and the DS parameters across
different time periods.
First, we analyse if and how the CAP reforms triggered a change in risk
attitude of cereal farmers. We report in Table 4 the AP and DS risk aversion
parameters for the periods encompassing the pre-CAP reform period, as well
as for the Mac Sharry reform, the Agenda 2000 implementation period up to
the 2003 climate shock, and for the Fischler reform, as outlined in Table 5. We
also conducted sensitivity analysis by excluding from the estimation of system
of equation (5) the final year preceding the implementation phase of a new
reform.
We find cereal producers to be risk averse over the variance of profit (AP
coefficient) in the pre-CAP period (1990–2002), whereas the DS risk aversion
coefficients are not statistically significant, which indicate risk neutrality over
the third moment of profit distribution. The latter result is easily expected in the
preMac Sharry reform’s context, where the CAP achieved income stabilisation
indirectly, through price support mechanisms.
The AP coefficient increases and remains statistically significant during the
Mac Sharry reform (1993–1999), and the DS risk coefficient becomes positive
and statistically significant. This suggests that farmers display clearer evi-
dences of risk-averse behaviour after the introduction of the first CAP reform
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Table 4. Estimated risk aversion and Wald test statistic for equality of coefficients
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors of the underlying estimated coefficients (θ̂2 and θ̂3) in parenthesis. Bootstrap
replications: 500. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. The suffix t1 and t2 indicate
the periods compared in the Wald test statistics as shown in each row. Dotted brackets indicate that we reject the null
hypothesis of stable risk attitude for both AP and DS coefficients at 1, 5 or 10 per cent level. If only one bracket is
drawn across two periods, we reject/accept the hypothesis for both AP and DS coefficients.
in the early 1990s. The Wald test for the stability of the AP the DS parameters
between the pre-CAP reform period and theMac Sharry reform period strongly
reject the hypothesis of stable risk attitude through the decade 1990–1999. We
also strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality of estimated AP and DS risk
parameters between the first triennium of the Mac Sharry period (1993–1995),
which roughly corresponds to the formal transitional phase of the reform,
compared with the implementation phase of this reform (1996–1999). This
suggests that farmers incur an implicit higher cost of risk bearing during the
transition phase, possibly due to the uncertainties brought by the introduction
of the CAP reform, the GATT’s entrance into force and the EU enlargement
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Table 5. Estimated risk aversion and Wald test statistic for equality of coefficients
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors of the underlying estimated coefficients (θ̂2 and θ̂3) in parenthesis. Bootstrap
replications: 500. ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at 1 and 5 per cent, respectively. The suffix t1 and t2 indicate the
periods compared in the Wald test statistics as shown in each row. Dotted brackets indicate that we reject the null
hypothesis of stable risk attitude for both AP and DS coefficients at 1 or 5 per cent level. If only one bracket is drawn
across two periods, we reject/accept the null hypothesis for both AP and DS coefficients.
by three new member States. During the implementation phase in of the Mac
Sharry reform (1996–1999), farmers risk aversion gradually decreased again.16
These results suggest the existence of two opposite effects. First, it is
frequently difficult to foresee changes in government policies, particularly
where decisions are influenced by social and political considerations, and this
situation may trigger an increase of farmers’ risk aversion (REAS, 2010).
Moschini and Hennessy (2001) argue that changes in policy interventions,
such as the CAP reforms in the 1990s, can become sources of uncertainty
that can create risk for agricultural investment (Gardner, 2002, for example
from US agricultural policies). This might happen despite the fact that policy
interventions in the agricultural sector are often intended to reduce the level
of risk faced by farmers. This consideration brings us to the second possible
effect: the policy reforms reduced the random component of farmers’ income,
which could lead to a decrease in farmers’ risk aversion compared with the pre-
CAP reform period, as discussed in (Koundouri, Laukkanen andMyyra, 2009).
16 These results are robust if we exclude from the estimation of (5) the year preceding a reform, that
is, 1992 from the pre-CAP reform estimation period and 1999 in theMac Sharry reform estimation
period. We present these sensitive analyses in Supplementary Table A4 in the Appendix.
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This effect seems to dominate in the implementation phase of the Mac Sharry
reform as well as during the implementation of the Fischler reform. During
the latter, the switch to decoupling, with the introduction of the single farm
payment, led to farmers being less risk averse over the variance of distribution
of profit, and become risk neutral over DS risk. This is coherent with the fact
that Italian farmers participation rates to insurances programs is exceptionally
low (Mahul and Stutley, 2010; Di Falco et al., 2014; Santeramo et al., 2016)
and it is also in line with the findings of studies estimating farmers’ risk attitude
in other European countries (Gardebroek, 2006; Groom et al., 2008).
5.2. Changes in risk attitude after the climate shocks
We report in Table 4 the estimated risk parameters for the post 2003 and 2007
droughts sub-periods.
The results of Table 4 offer further evidences of instability of risk aversion
through time. We perform the Wald test for equality of risk parameters before
and after the droughts, within relevant sub-periods identified through the
analysis presented in Table 5. The null hypothesis of equality of AP risk
aversion parameters before and after the 2003 and 2007 climate shocks is
strongly rejected. The AP risk aversion parameter slightly decreases after the
2003 and 2007 droughts. The null hypothesis of equality of DS risk aversion
parameters before and after the 2003 and 2007 climate shocks is rejected after
the 2003 but not after the 2007 drought.
As discussed, the 2003 drought hit the Italian economy the same year of the
midterm review of the Agenda 2000. Hence, these results might indicate that
the risk aversion mitigating effects triggered by the described policy changes
dominated a possible increase in risk aversion, which could be expected after
farmers experience a major drought.
We warn the reader that this is not the only confounding effect, for example
while the Italian agricultural sector was counting the damages caused by
the 2007 drought, the whole Italian economy was put under stress by the
onset of the 2008 financial crisis. Disentangling these multiple effects is
very difficult or impossible, especially through econometric applications on
observed economic behaviour from secondary data, as the one adopted in this
article. This makes it impossible to draw conclusive comparison on the impacts
that climate shocks may have on risk attitude compared with those triggered by
major policy changes. The result that the DS risk aversion parameters remain
very small or not statistically significant is interesting and deserves further
investigation, because of its implication on farmers’ vulnerability and need for
public support to cope with climate shocks, which can become more frequent
under climate-change scenario.
5.3. Concluding remarks
Agents’ risk attitude, along with risk perception and risk exposure, are cru-
cial for explaining their production and investment decisions. The question
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whether structural parameters of human behaviour such as risk aversion and
risk perceptions are stable through time become popular in macroeconomic
modeling since the publication of the classic Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976). The
question is also debated in studies that focus on the agricultural sector, which
is particularly exposed to climate-related shocks and policy changes (Louhichi
et al., 2010; Lehmann, Briner and Finger, 2013).
This article adds to the existing literature, as we attempt to identify the
impact of a range of diverse shocks on risk attitude. Using a rich panel data
structure, we capture the time dimension in risk attitude’s evolution. Notably,
we analyse both the impact of policy changes and production shocks driven by
droughts, recovering risk attitude looking at agents’ revealed decision through
a long period of time. We find evidence for temporal instability of risk attitude
using the example of Italian agriculture over the period 1990–2009. These
changes in risk attitude can be associated to major changes in agricultural
policy regimes and to some extent to shocks in climate conditions.
More specifically, we find temporal instability for farmers’ aversion to the
variance of profit, the AP coefficient of risk aversion. In contrast, farmers’
aversion to extreme (DS) events, expressed with the skewness of profits,
exhibits more stability through time.
Other authors provided general insights that the changes in policy interven-
tions, such as the CAP reforms in the 1990s, can become sources of uncertainty
that can create considerable risk for agricultural investment (Moschini and
Hennessy, 2001). In general, our analysis indicates that risk aversion coeffi-
cients tend to increase at each introduction of a policy change. We suggest
that the build-up of progressive uncertainty through the complex system of
government interventions that characterises the European policy framework of
the late 1990s and early 2000 led at first to an increase of risk aversion. Instead,
policies that aim to stabilise farmers’ income and that are implemented for
long enough without undergoing a continued reform process tend to trigger
more risk neutral or loving behaviours, a result also found in other studies
(Koundouri, Laukkanen and Myyra, 2009). As new policies are introduced,
farmers tend to become more risk averse, but this effect fades through the
implementation period of the policy, and eventually the mitigating effect on
risk aversion of the policy dominates. This factor seems to be particularly
strong after the introduction of the Fischler reform, with the switch to the
single farm payment, decoupling a large share of CAP support from production
from 2005 onwards. It may also have mitigated the increases in risk aversion
expected after the 2003 and 2007 droughts. More specifically, we do not find
large effects of these drought events on farmer risk attitudes. This contrasts
findings in non-agricultural domains (Eckel, El-Gamal and Wilson, 2009,
Page, Savage and Torgler, 2014, Hanaoka, Shigeoka and Watanabe, 2018)
but may be also due to the confounding occurrence of climate and policy
shocks.
In our context, this means that key behavioural parameters such as risk
aversion coefficients may change through time in relationship to significant
changes in policies, and we shall take this into account if we are going
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to be concerned about the policy implications of our models or about our
ability to forecast when there are changes in policy regimes, such as the CAP
reforms. Since the publication of the seminal article by Lucas (1976), several
studies looking at investors’ behaviours also debated whether agents react
differently to policy shocks perceived as permanent or transitory. Our findings
suggest the need for such better understanding also in the specific context of
decision-making in the agricultural sector.
These findings open up future avenues of research, as it is often assumed
that individual risk aversion is time invariant. The instability of risk attitude is
potentially a serious barrier to our understanding of farmers’ decision-making
under uncertainty, particularly relevant also in the context of risk exposure in
agriculture.
In this article, we use the method of moments on a much larger panel
data set of those used in previous similar studies. A limitation of this study
is that we can only recover risk attitude from past farm-level accounting
data, but we cannot provide a full account on how risk preferences changed
through time. To analyse the latter, we would need to obtain separately risk
attitude and risk perception, but unfortunately our data set does not allow
us to recover information on farmers’ risk perceptions in the past. This, in
turn, would allow a more robust conceptualisation and prediction of farmers’
reactions and resilience to shocks (Meuwissen et al., 2019; Pennings, Wansink
and Meulenberg, 2002). To date, there is only a limited number of studies
measuring risk preferences with the same individuals’ multiple times over
time (Mata et al., 2018). Yet, these are virtually inexistent for farmers. Future
research should account for this shortcoming. A recent article by Schild-
berg-Hörisch (2018) stressed that once we empirically show the possibility of
systematic change in risk preferences, an array of fundamental questions arises,
for example on how can we evaluate alternative policy options or perform
welfare analyses when individuals’ preferences lack complete (time) stability.
European agriculture is increasingly exposed to climate change and possibly
significant policy changes, and the support of risk management is of increasing
relevance in recent CAP reforms (El Benni, Finger and Meuwissen, 2016).
For these reasons, researchers and policymakers alike need to enhance their
understanding of the implication of risk preferences that are unstable over time.
Despite the discussed potential issues related to the challenge of identifying
separately (production) risk and risk preferences from behavioural equations
(i.e. first-order conditions on input choices) on observed data (Lence, 2009;
Just and Just, 2011), this method provides an empirical application that allows
retrieving agents’ attitude for risk even when survey data with risk preferences
elicitation nor the results of ad hoc field and lab experiments are available. Our
approach does not replace the methods based on primary data. On the contrary,
such methods shall provide further tests for the robustness of our findings and
enhance understanding of time-invariant risk aversion (and risk preferences)
in agriculture. Such methodological comparison is beyond the scope of this
article and left for future research.
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Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at European Review of Agricultural Eco-
nomics online.
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